"I desire to know the power and nature of time, by-which we measure the movements of bodies."1 This sentence, with which I closed the preceding chapter and to which I will return, signals-as I observed in chapter 4-a shift within the time-investigation in Confessions XI. Having rejected a specific identity of 'times' (tempora) with the celestial revolutions in XI.23.29, yet having also suggested a thesis in which motus omnis constitutes 'times' (tempora), Augustine then sharpens his question: hereafter, his question of 'time' (tempus) is a question of that "by-which we measure the movements of [all] bodies" (XI.23.30). As Augustine specifies in XI.24.31,2 it is solely this 'by-which' of temporal mensuration that provides the most originary sense of his word 'time' (tempus), and this 'by-which' he comes to describe as a 'dilation' (distentio).
The preceding chapters sought to identify the speculative condition for the timelessness of the caelum intellectuale in Confessions XII, and in so doing, to clarify a sub-phenomenal condition for 'time' (i.e. dilation)-for beasts as for humans-in Confessions XI. Augustine's natura intellectualis is timeless because it is fleshless; sensual contuitus and the duplicity of praesens that characterizes it are rather the condition of a vita temporalis. In short: 'no sensation = no dilation = no time (tempus).' But sensus carnis (i.e. anima-animus as vita corporis) is not the sole condition of time in the Confessions, as we will see after briefly reconstructing Augustine's concept of "indeterminate matter" (materia informis) in Confessions XII, which is also timeless. If the haerere is Augustine's intellectual condition for (dimensive) time-and thus, remotively, for the timelessness of the hyper-heavenly-what is his corporeal condition for (mutive) times?
Unlike the fleshlessness of the caelum intellectuale, which is never explicitly stated in Confessions XII (and which thus required the analysis of subterranean links between books X and XII), Augustine repeatedly articulates (i) the absolute indeterminacy of his materia informis, and (ii) the speculative conditions for this material's timelessness (and thereby, obliquely, for 'times') in book XII. The most significant aspect of this condition can be stated, for the purposes of the present exposition, as 'no motus omnis = no tempora.' This formula captures the logical dependence of tempus upon motus that Alliez and Castoriadis deny in Confessions XI. Yet neither Alliez nor Castoriadis contests that this dependence is stated in Confessions XII, though only disjunctivists-such as Castoriadis-take this into consideration (see 2.3).3 Indeed, it is precisely the clarity of this condition in Confessions XII that provokes the question of a critical disjunction between Augustine's time-statements in books XI and XII-a question to which the present work is, in part, devoted. Let us recall Castoriadis' verdict:
Augustine contradicts himself openly and naively. . . . Time here [in Confessions XII] has ceased to be just the distentio animi [of book XI], the stretching of my mind; it is that in which the forms vertuntur, are changing into one another, and it is produced by this mutation of forms, strictly dependent on it.4
Pace Castoriadis, it is not 'time' but 'times' which are 'produced by [a] mutation of forms' in Confessions XII (as in XI.23.29); and pace Castoriadis, there is no 'contradiction' to be observed here.
But to begin: What is Augustine's concept of the materia informis?
9.1
Informitas and Timelessness (Conf. XII.6)
In chapters 7 and 8, I sought to demonstrate that, and how-albeit tacitly-a similar remotive or reductive procedure on time that issues (as von Herrmann suggests)5 in Augustine's conception of eternity in Confessions XI, also operates on sense-temporal presence and pleasure to issue in his conception of the caelum intellectuale in book XII. The difficulty of this hyper-heavenly is, as I have observed, that it is conceived as living but not as a life.
